一個中國的大迷惑《經濟學人》

一個中國的大迷惑《經濟學人》

The great obfuscation of one-China

美國不接受一個中國原則。 相反，它有一個中國的政策，美國承認中國有這樣一個原則 --- 兩者不是相同的一件事。 美國不承認中國對台灣的主權，也不承認台灣是獨立國家。 儘管如此，美國台灣間仍有很多貿易行為。 台灣是美國出口的第九大買家，超過意大利和印度。

America does not accept the one-China principle. Instead it has the one-China policy, which acknowledges that China has such a principle—not quite the same thing. America does not recognise Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, nor does it recognise Taiwan as an independent state. It does plenty of trade with it, though. Small as it is, Taiwan is the ninth-largest buyer of American exports, outstripping Italy and India.

只有一個中國原則的和氣(想像)小說才可把東亞的和平維持下去 --- 但現在各方面正處於壓力之下. The polite fiction that there is only one China has kept the peace in East Asia—but now it is coming under pressure from all directions

1979年的“台灣關係法”美國承諾幫助台灣捍衛自己免遭入侵和禁運，認為島上的任何脅迫都是“對美國的嚴重關切”。

Relations Act of 1979 commits America to helping Taiwan defend itself against invasion and embargoes, deeming any coercion of the island to be “of grave concern to the United States”.

在台灣本身，有一個奇怪的歷史傳說"一個中國公式"。 根據(想像)小說，島內第一任總統蔣介石在1949年因和毛澤東共產黨內戰落敗而逃至台灣，望有一天會奪回統一整個中國， 所以台灣的官方名稱"中華民國"。 因此，蔣介石領導的黨，國民黨和中國政府兩者可以簽署一個叫做“九二共識”的協議，雙方承認只有一個中國，但各自表述模糊一中內涵。

In Taiwan itself the one-China formula has an even stranger history. It is rooted in the fiction that the island’s first president, Chiang Kai-shek, who fled there in 1949 after losing a civil war to Mao Zedong’s communists, would one day recapture the whole of China. Hence Taiwan’s official name, the Republic of China. Thus the party that Chiang led, the Kuomintang (KMT), and the Chinese government can both subscribe to an agreement called the “1992 consensus”, which says that there is only one China but recognises that the two sides disagree about what that means in practice, thus piling fudge upon ambiguity.

美國可能再也不能像1996年台海危機一樣派遣兩架航空母艦到台灣海峽，迫使中國撤退。但是如果爆發台海兩岸敵對行動，美國幾乎肯定會被捲入。美國對“台灣關係法” 沒有完全的義務，但美國會避免其作為造成其超級大國的地位和聲望的一個致命打擊。 美國也會有經濟考量：台灣生產的半導體佔世界的五分之一以上; 中國的封鎖可能會造成全世界電腦產業跛腳。America might no longer be able to dispatch two aircraft-carrier groups to the Taiwan Strait to force China to back down, as it did in 1996. But if hostilities were to break out America would almost surely be drawn in. The Taiwan Relations Act does not fully oblige it to, but to refrain would be a mortal blow to its position and prestige as a superpower. There would also be economic considerations: Taiwan makes more than a fifth of the world’s semiconductors; a Chinese blockade could cripple the computer industry.

大陸有一千四百個針對台灣的地面導彈，還有未知數量從空中和海上發射的導彈。 儘管台灣存在反導彈防禦 - 美國愛國者導彈和台灣自己的飛彈系統 - 島上的空軍基地和許多其他防禦系統可能會被中國強烈火力迅速摧毀。 但中國入侵需要有地面部隊，在180公里開闊水域台灣海峽對岸航行渡海入侵的中國部隊，會遭受在中國火力攻擊下倖存的台灣軍隊狙擊造成(重傷害)非常不愉快。 引述楊先生說，中國為了入侵成功，中國需要迅速摧毀台灣85％以上的飛彈，如果在第一波襲擊中，有一半的台灣飛彈倖存下來，中國的入侵勢力就會被削弱。The mainland has around 1,400 land-based missiles aimed at Taiwan, plus an unknown number of air- and sea-launched ones. Despite the presence of anti-missile defences—both American Patriot missiles and Taiwan’s own systems—the island’s air bases and many of its other defences might be quickly destroyed by all that firepower. But an invasion requires troops on the ground—ground which, in this case, lies the other side of 180km of open water. And Taiwan’s surviving forces could make that voyage very unpleasant. Mr Yang says that, for an invasion to succeed, China would need promptly to destroy 85% or more of Taiwan’s own missiles; if half of Taiwan’s missiles survived the first wave of attacks, China’s invasion force would be vulnerable.

http://econ.st/2snV7Yq